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Executive Registry

10/77

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Stan:

I have reviewed the draft Management Plan for Test Ban Treaty Implementation and Monitoring which was circulated for NFIB action on 9 November 1977. The plan is deficient in several respects and, as written, is unacceptable to this department. Apparently, the working group which drafted this plan did not invite anyone in this department with policy or resource management responsibility to participate. The plan's weaknesses reflect this.

This plan should be withdrawn and not forwarded to the SCC until it is rewritten and coordinated with the proper offices.

Attached are more specific comments.

Sincerely,

Charles

Attachment

OSD review(s) completed.

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WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

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COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR TEST BAN TREATY
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING

1. The plan proposes that a subgroup of the SCC provide "overall management" for test ban monitoring activities. This conflicts with the terms of Presidential Directive/NSC-2 on the National Security Council System which states the SCC will be involved in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential decisions.

2. This plan contains no analysis of any perceived inadequacies in the current intelligence community structure which has responsibility for monitoring foreign nuclear explosions or proliferation. It is impossible to determine how the proposed structure in the plan would remedy unstated problems.

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4. On page 3, the Test Ban Monitoring Steering Group is described as consisting of "senior intelligence officers (NFIB level) representing the DCI, CIA, DoD, DOE and DOS." Why is there a need for a separate group to deal with the subject of test ban monitoring? Why cannot the NFIB itself perform this function? This Steering Group would be tasked under the plan to make resource recommendations to the Budget and Evaluation Staff. As the NFIB already does that, it is unclear why a different group is needed.

5. Regarding the judgement expressed on page 14 that the technical intelligence functions have generally performed satisfactorily, whose judgement is that? It was not the conclusion of the 1976 Deutch report regarding proliferation intelligence nor is it the conclusion of the current CCPC study on proliferation collection problems.

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